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Abstract
This paper develops a tractable dynamic microeconomic model of migration de-
cisions that is aggregated to describe the behavior of interregional migration. Our
structural approach allows us to deal with dynamic self-selection problems that arise
from the endogeneity of location choice and the persistency of migration incentives.
Keeping track of the distribution of migration incentives over time has important
consequences, because the dynamics of this distribution inuences the estimation of
structural parameters, such as migration costs. For US interstate migration, we ob-
tain a cost estimate of somewhat less than one-half of an average annual household
income. This is substantially less than the migration costs estimated by previous
studies. We attribute this di¤erence to the treatment of the dynamic self-selection
problem.
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1 Introduction
Migration decisions are important economic decisions. Migration allows individual agents
to smooth their income and is an important way of adjustment to macroeconomic shocks
(Blanchard and Katz, 1992). Many factors inuence the decision to migrate and there
is a vast empirical literature that links migration decisions to economic incentives (see
Greenwood, 1975, 1985, and 1997 and Cushing and Poot, 2004 for survey articles). At
the same time, most of this literature has remained relatively silent about the actual costs
of migration to individual agents. Nevertheless, migration costs are surely a structural
parameter of high interest (Sjaastad, 1962).
So, there has recently been a small number of studies that actually do report estimates
on migration costs. Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001) report a cost estimate of about
US$ 180,000 for each migration between US states, and Kennan and Walker (2003,
2006) conclude that, all other things equal, migration costs are between US$ 176,000
and US$ 270,000.1 In terms of average annual income, this magnitude of migration
costs corresponds to roughly 4-6 average annual household incomes. At any rate, such
an estimate appears very high and even the authors of these studies are somewhat
sceptical about their ndings.
Kennan and Walker (2003) suggest that some kind of omitted variable problem may
drive the high cost-estimate. In particular, they suggest that an unobservable wage
component is correlated to the decision to stay. We argue that the endogeneity of the
location choice will always lead to such correlation. In fact, this papers rst result is
that it is necessary to keep track of the unobservable distribution of migration incentives
over time to obtain an unbiased estimate of migration costs.
This motivates us to develop a tractable microeconomic model of migration which can
be aggregated and used to describe the simultaneous evolution of migration incentives
and migration rates at an aggregate level. Our model picks up the general idea that
migration can be understood as an investment into human capital (Sjaastad, 1962). In
particular, the migration-decision problem is closely related to the decision problem for
discrete investment projects or lumpy investment.
For the lumpy investment setup, Caballero and Engel (1999) develop a methodologi-
cal framework that allows them to estimate micro-level investment costs from aggregate
data only. We extend their work to migration decisions. This means that we rst de-
velop a structural model of the representative microeconomic problem of migration for
1These estimates do not yet include mark-ups for distance and other factors that inuence the psychic
costs of migration. Return migration is usually associated with lower, but still substantial costs.
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heterogeneous households and in a second step, this model is used to derive the evolu-
tion of the distribution of migration incentives. This evolution of incentives determines
aggregate migration in turn.
We simulate this model and estimate migration costs via indirect inference (see
Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault, 1993 and Smith, 1993). Particularly, we apply
Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renaults (1993) method of simulated moments. We esti-
mate migration costs to be about US$ 20,000, which is somewhat less than one-half
of the average annual income. This cost estimate is substantially lower than the cost
estimates reported by previous studies. Moreover, we show that applying the techniques
used in other papers, we would obtain higher cost estimates also from data generated
by a simulation of our structural model. Consequently, we conclude that keeping track
of the distribution of migration incentives over time has an important inuence on the
estimation of migration costs. This nding extends the role of self-selection problems
to a dynamic setup, which so far have been highlighted in static frameworks (see for
example Borjas, 1987, Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo, 1992, Tunali, 2000, and Hunt and
Mueller, 2004).
Finding more reasonable cost estimates parallels the results of the investment litera-
ture, in which much more reasonable estimates of adjustment costs were obtained when
xed adjustment costs to capital were included into dynamic models. For migration,
the issue of xed and sunk costs was emphasized in the real-options approach by Burda
(1993) and Burda et al. (1998). However, these papers only look at migration as a once
and for all decision, so that they preclude return migration. Moreover, the papers do
not study the evolution of migration incentives, to which past migration decisions feed
back.
Taking into account these feedbacks, we extend the structural approaches of Davies,
Greenwood, and Li (2001) and Kennan and Walker (2006) and suggest a fully struc-
tural model of migration that is based upon dynamic optimization and hence takes into
account the dynamic character of the migration decision. This allows us to track the dy-
namic evolution of migration incentives at the macroeconomic level, but it comes at the
cost that we have to reduce the model to a bi-regional setup for numerical feasibility. One
distinct feature of our model is that it allows us to infer the structural microeconomic
parameters of the migration decision from aggregrate data only.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief discus-
sion of the di¢ culties of estimating structural migration models when the population
dynamically self-selects into its preferred region. The section develops the main motive
of our paper and illustrates why migration costs are hard to identify by standard (dis-
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crete choice) estimation techniques. Thereafter, Section 3 presents a tractable dynamic
microeconomic model of the migration decision which assumes that an agent maximizes
future expected well-being by location choice. In Section 4, we show how to aggregate
the model. We derive the contemporaneous law of motion of the distribution of mi-
gration incentives and aggregate migration rates, taking into account heterogeneity at
the microeconomic level. We provide the results of a numerical simulation analysis in
Section 5 to give an idea of how the proposed model actually behaves. Section 6 nally
confronts the model with aggregate data on migration between US states and presents
the estimates of the structural parameters of the model, particularly the estimates of
migration costs. Section 7 concludes and an appendix provides detailed proofs as well
as details on the data employed.
2 What makes migration costs so hard to identify?
Most micro studies and now also more macro studies on migration link the individual
migration decision to a probabilistic model in which agents migrate if the gain in utility
terms obtained by migration,
umoveit   ustayit

= xit + it; (1)
is large enough and exceeds some threshold value c.2 This threshold value c can be
interpreted as migration costs in utility terms. The vector of covariates xit is composed
of information that describes the economic incentives to migrate, i.e. the gains from
migration.
For example, xit could contain data on remuneration, on labor market conditions,
and on amenities for both the home and the destination region. The vector of parameters
 measures the sensitivity of the migration decision to these economic incentives. The
stochastic component it reects di¤erences across agents, omitted migration incentives,
and/or some variability of migration costs.
Typically, we are interested in the structural parameters  and c and hence would
estimate some version of (1) to infer these parameters: Unfortunately, such direct ap-
proach is very di¢ cult due to the unobservability of the potential migration gains to
the outside observer. To illustrate this point, suppose an agent only cares about the
di¤erence in income between home and destination region.
In such setting, xit were simply a measure of relative income potentials for an agent
2See for example Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001), Hunt and Mueller (2004) or Kennan and Walker
(2006).
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which she can realize by location choice. A rational agent then moves to the region where
she earns the most, provided that her migration costs are covered by the discounted
present value of the di¤erences in future incomes.
However, the econometrician can only observe the income that an agent realizes
in the region in which she is currently living. Therefore, the other, the unobserved,
potential income has to be proxied. Typically, it is proxied by an income a similar agent
realizes in the other region.3 At a macro level, this often means replacing agent-specic
income di¤erences by average income di¤erences across regions, see for example Davies,
Greenwood, and Li (2001).
If we proxy the unobservable income di¤erence xit for individual i in equation (1) by
the average income di¤erence x:t between source and destination region, then we obtain
umoveit   ustayit

= x:t +  (xit   x:t) + it| {z }
composed error term
: (2)
The composed error term  (xit   x:t)+it now also includes the idiosyncratic component
of income di¤erences it := (xit   x:t). Since we do not want to base our following
argument on a classical measurement error or omitted variable problem, we may assume
that the idiosyncratic component to the income di¤erence it is orthogonal to the average
income di¤erence.4 For the ease of exposition, also suppose that the agent really just
cares about income, so that the true stochastic component is actually identical to zero,
it  0:
Under these assumptions, we can rewrite (2) as
umoveit   ustayit

= x:t + it: (3)
In this equation, the regression residual only captures the distribution of idiosyncratic
potential income di¤erences around the mean.
While the migration decision is deterministic to the individual in this setting, it is
stochastic to the econometrician due to his lack of knowledge of it: If the econometrician
were to know the distribution of the unobserved component it; he could nonetheless
estimate  with a suitable probabilistic discrete choice model. However, assuming one
3One example is the paper of Hunt and Mueller (2004) that does a Mincer-type wage regression to
obtain the unobservable income potential. A similar example can be found in Burda et al. (1998) or
Kennan and Walker (2006).
4Alternatively, one could think of it as being the unexplained residual of a Mincer-type wage regres-
sion and x:t being the income component that is explained by all observable characteristics of the agent.
Our line of argument applies to this microeconomic interpretation, too.
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of the standard distributions for it; e.g. a logistic distribution, is problematic.
Suppose agents are heterogeneous with respect to potential incomes, so that the
idiosyncratic component it has a non-degenerated distribution. In particular, assume
that it is initially normally distributed as displayed in Figure 1 (a), so that in the
initial situation a probit model were appropriate. The gure displays the distribution
of migration incentives, i.e. potential incomes, xit = x:t + it: Low values of this sum
imply that income in region A is favorable, high values of this sum imply better income
prospects in region B: Correspondingly, all agents with x:t + it < 0 decide to live in
region A and they decide to live in region B otherwise if we assume zero migration costs
for the moment. In other words, the agents self-select into the region that is favorable
for them.5
As a result, the distribution of income di¤erences changes for the next period. No
agent who lives in region A prefers to live in region B: This means that for those agents
who live in region A the distribution of income di¤erences is as displayed in Figure 1 (b).
E¤ectively, the right-hand part of the distribution in Figure 1 (a) has been cut, because
all agents with higher income in region B have actually chosen B as the region to live
in.
It can be seen that the migration incentives x:t+it are no longer normally distributed
conditional on a household living in region A: Since the estimation residual it in our
setup results from a linear transformation of the migration incentive x:t + it; also the
estimation residual it is no longer normally distributed. Accordingly, the distributional
assumptions to estimate (1) by standard maximum likelihood techniques are no longer
fullled.
Even adding a normally distributed idiosyncratic income shock does not reestablish a
normal distribution of income di¤erences if income di¤erences are su¢ ciently persistent.
Figure 1 (c) displays how mild idiosyncratic shocks alter the distribution displayed in
Figure 1 (b) : Again, the distribution is di¤erent from the standard distributions assumed
in the estimation of discrete-choice models. The colored-in region indicates the set of
agents that will migrate from A to B after the idiosyncratic shocks.
Besides idiosyncratic shocks, also aggregate shocks to the income di¤erence x:t inu-
ence the migration decisions of agents. Figure 1 (d) shows the distribution of migration
incentives as in Figure 1 (c) but after an adverse shock to region A: By comparing Fig-
ures 1 (c) and 1 (d), one can see that the shape of the distribution after migration di¤ers
5This self-selection is driven directly by the heterogeneity of the agents with respect to potential
incomes, but is does not reect immanent and xed di¤erences of the regions as in Borjas (1987) and
Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992).
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Figure 1: Distribution of potential income in region B relative to A
(a) overall population (b) conditional on living in region A
after migration
(c) conditional on living in region A (d) conditional on living in region A
after migration and idiosyncratic after migration, idiosyncratic,
shocks and aggregate shocks
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(the not colored-in region). In consequence, the distribution of migration incentives will
not be strictly stationary, it will evolve over time, and it will depend on the history of
aggregate shocks.
Hence, the distribution di¤ers in two important aspects from those assumed in stan-
dard discrete-choice models. Firstly, it will not be one of the standard distributions
considered. Secondly, it will display a dynamic behavior as a result of aggregate shocks.
Now, how does this correspond to an unreasonable estimate of migration costs? If
c is normalized to 1, the parameter  has a straightforward interpretation. It measures
the sensitivity of migration decisions to income incentives and its inverse 1 is exactly
the income di¤erential at which an average agent is just indi¤erent between moving and
not moving. Or to put it di¤erently, c is the money measure of average migration costs.
In turn, this implies that a bias in  directly translates into a bias in estimated
migration costs. And with the distribution of migration incentives misspecied,  will
be estimated with a bias most probably. The misspecication of the distribution of
migration incentives has two aspects. One is that the distribution will always be non-
standard, i.e. neither normal nor logistic. The second aspect is that the distribution also
changes over time as a result of aggregate shocks to income and the triggered migration
decisions.
To put it simply: agents are in a certain region most likely because they are better
o¤ living there. Because of this self-selection, the distribution of unobserved migration
incentives is most likely not symmetric (see Greenwood, 1985, pp. 533). Additionally,
it displays a dynamic behavior. Accordingly, one needs to keep track of the evolution
of the incentive distribution and standard techniques to deal with self-selection cannot
be applied in a straightforward way. Therefore, we develop a model based on dynamic
optimal migration decisions in the presence of persistent shocks to income. This model
can then be aggregated and used to simulate the evolution of migration and its incentives
over time.
3 A simple stochastic model of migration decisions
We consider an economy with two regions, A and B: For simplicity, this economy is
assumed to be inhabited by a continuum of innitely lived agents of measure 1. We
model the economy in discrete time and at each point in time an agent has to decide in
which region to live and work. First, we consider the decision problem of an individual
agent. For simplicity, we drop the index i that has denoted the specic individual before,
but use this index to indicate regions, i = A;B.
Living in region i at time t gives the agent utility ~wit: Although ~wit is a catch-all
8
variable for migration incentives, which can be interpreted as wage income, employment
prospects, amenities, utility from social networks etc., we refer to ~wit as income for
simplicity.
The agent discounts future utility by factor  < 1 and maximizes the discounted
sum of expected future utility by location choice. Moving from one region to the other
is not costless to an agent. When an agent moves, she is subject to a disutility ct that
enters additively in her utility function.
Hence, the instantaneous utility function u(i; j; t) is given by
u (i; j; t) = ~wit   Ij 6=ict (4)
for an agent that has lived in region j before and now lives in region i: Here, I denotes
an indicator function, which equals 1 if the agent has moved from region j to i and 0 if
the agent already lived in region i before.
Both variables, migration incentive (income ~wit) and moving costs (ct); are stochastic
in our model. They vary over time and across individuals, but are observed by the agent
before she chooses her location. The agent knows the distribution of both components of
her utility function and forms rational expectations about future incomes and migration
costs.
Since migration costs are stochastic and hence vary, not all individual agents who
face the same income di¤erential will actually take the same migration decision. In this
sense, the individuals in our model are heterogenous and to the outside observer the
migration decision is stochastic.
With both ~wit and ct being stochastic, the potential migrant waits not only for good
income opportunities but also for low migration costs. In her migration decision, she
thus takes into account two option values. One is the value to wait and learn more about
future incomes and the other is to wait and search for lower migration costs.
Migration costs themselves depend on many factors and may include both physical
and psychic costs of migration (Sjaastad, 1962), but the factors that determine migration
costs are not constant. For example, search costs to nd a new job and accommodation
evolve with market conditions, the disutility of living separated from a family or spouse
changes over time, just as marital status itself is neither constant nor irreversible. We
pick up the variability in migration costs ct by assuming them to be independently and
identically distributed according to a distribution function G:
The distribution of migration incentives, ~wit; is assumed to be log-normal. In partic-
ular, we assume that log income, wit; follows an AR(1) process with normally distributed
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innovations it and autoregressive coe¢ cient  :
ln ( ~wit) =: wit = i (1  ) + wit 1 + it: (5)
This process holds for the whole continuum of agents and each agent draws her own
series of innovations it for both regions. The expected value of log income in region i is
i. The innovations it are composed of aggregate as well as idiosyncratic components.
They have mean zero, are serially uncorrelated, but may be correlated across regions
A,B (see Section 4.2).
Income and cost distributions, together with the utility function and the discount
factor dene the decision problem for the potential migrant. This is an optimization
problem, which is described by the following Bellman equation:
V (j; ct; wAt; wBt) = max
i=A;B

exp (wit)  Ifi6=jgct + EtV (i; ct+1; wA;t+1; wB;t+1)
	
: (6)
In this equation, Et denotes the expectations operator with respect to information avail-
able at time t:6
The optimal policy is relatively simple. The agent migrates from region j to region
i if and only if the costs of migration are lower than the sum of the expected value
gain Et [V (i; ct+1; wA;t+1; wB;t+1)  V (j; ct+1; wA;t+1; wB;t+1)] and the direct benets
of migration expwit   expwjt: This means that the agent migrates if and only if
ct  expwit expwjt+Et [V (i; ct+1; wA;t+1; wB;t+1)  V (j; ct+1; wA;t+1; wB;t+1)] : (7)
The expected value di¤erence
Et [V (i; ct+1; wA;t+1; wB;t+1)  V (j; ct+1; wA;t+1; wB;t+1)]
may for example reect di¤erent income expectations. Holding income expectations
constant, the di¤erence of the expected values also reects the di¤erences in expected
future migration costs.
Since the costs of migration, ct; are assumed to be i.i.d., expected costs at time
t + 1 do not depend on information available at time t: Moreover, the distribution of
6For technical reasons, we need to assume boundedness of it; so that it is in fact only approximately
normal. The bounds to it turn the optimization problem into a bounded returns problem, which is
easier to solve. But the bounds to it can be chosen arbitrarily wide (but nite) so that the distribution
of ~wit approximates the log-normal distribution arbitrarily close. Existence and uniqueness of the value
function is proved in the appendix.
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future incomes (wA;t+1; wB;t+1) is a function of only (wAt; wBt) ; because wit follows a
Markov-process. This allows us to summarize the expected value di¤erence by a function
V (wAt; wBt) of only (wAt; wBt) ; which is dened as
V (wAt; wBt) := Et [V (B; ct+1; wA;t+1; wB;t+1)  V (A; ct+1; wA;t+1; wBt;+1)] : (8)
Substituting (8) for the value di¤erence in (7) gives a critical level of costs c at which
an agent living in region A is just indi¤erent between moving and not moving to region
B. This threshold is
c (wA; wB) := expwB   expwA +V (wAt; wBt) : (9)
To put it di¤erently, a person moves from A to B if and only if
ct  cA := c (wAt; wBt) :
Conversely, a person living in region B moves to region A if and only if
ct  cB :=  c (wAt; wBt) :
Note that c can be positive as well as negative. If c is positive, region B is more attractive.
If it is negative, region A is more attractive and a person living in region A would only
have an incentive to move to region B if migration costs were negative.
4 Aggregate migration and the dynamics of income distributions
4.1 Aggregate migration
Given this trigger rationale for migration, the hazard rate
i (wA; wB) := G (ci (wA; wB)) , i = A;B
is the probability that a person in region i moves to the other region if she faces the
potential incomes (wA; wB). This means that the likelihood of a person to move equals
the probability that her migration costs realize below the threshold value ci: Since we
assumed a continuum of agents, the actual fraction of migrating agents with income
pair (wA; wB) is equal to this hazard rate, too. Figure 2 displays an example of a
microeconomic migration-hazard function that stems from the optimization problem (6).
The gure shows how di¤erent income combinations change the probability to migrate
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Figure 2: Hazard-rates for migration from region A to region B conditional on potential
incomes
from region A to B:
Now, consider the distribution Ft of (potential) incomes (wA; wB) and household
locations. Suppose this income distribution is the distribution after the income shocks
it have been realized, but before migration decisions have been taken. Let fit denote
the conditional density of this income distribution, conditional on the household living
in region i at time t: Then, the actual fraction it of households living in i that migrate
to the other region evaluates as
it :=
Z
i (wA; wB)  fit (wA; wB) dwAdwB: (10)
This means that the aggregate migration hazard, it; is a convolution of the micro-
economic adjustment hazard i and the conditional income distribution fit: In other
words, the aggregate migration hazard can be thought of as a weighted mean of all mi-
croeconomic migration hazards, weighted by the density of income pairs (wA; wB) from
distribution Ft:
4.2 Dynamics of income distributions
The distribution Ft itself (and hence fit) evolves over time and is a result of direct shocks
to income just as it is a result of past migration. We need to characterize the law of
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motion for Ft to close our model and to obtain the sequence of aggregate migration rates.
4.2.1 The e¤ect of migration on income distributions
Recall that the distribution Ft is the joint distribution of potential incomes and household
locations. In order to follow the evolution of Ft we thus need to characterize both the
evolution of the fraction Pit of households living in each region as well as the conditional
distribution of incomes fit (conditional on a household actually living in a specic region
i).
The proportion of households living in region i at time t+ 1 is a result of migration
decisions at time t. The law of motion for Pit is given by
Pit+1 =
 
1  it

Pit +  itP it: (11)
The rst part of the sum reects the fraction of households that remain in region i;
where
 
1  it

is the probability to stay in region i. The second part is the fraction of
households that migrate from region  i to region i:
Since the microeconomic migration hazard depends on (wA; wB) ; di¤erent potential
incomes in both regions result in di¤erent propensities to migrate. In consequence,
migration changes not only the fraction Pit of households living in region i at time t; but
also the conditional distribution of income, fit: For example, households living in region
A; earning a low current income, wA; but facing a substantially higher potential income in
B; wB; are very likely to migrate. As a result, the number of those households strongly
decreases after migration decisions have been taken, while the number of households
facing a smaller income di¤erential changes less.
These considerations form the backbone of our argument. The distribution of mi-
gration incentives is a result of past migration decisions, and we can express the new
density of households with income (wA; wB) in region i after migration, f^it; by
f^it (wA; wB) = [1  it (wA; wB)] fit (wA; wB)Pit
Pit+1
+  it (wA; wB)
f it (wA; wB)P it
Pit+1
: (12)
The rst product and part of the sum gives the fraction of households that remain in re-
gion i. In this product, the probability [1  it (wA; wB)] is again the probability to stay
in region i. The term fit (wA; wB)Pit weights this probability and is the unconditional
income density for region i before migration has taken place. To obtain again the con-
ditional density, the unconditional income density, fit (wA; wB)Pit; is divided by Pit+1;
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which is the fraction (or probability) of households living in region i after migration (i.e.
in time t+ 1):
Analogously, the second part of the sum is constructed:  it (wA; wB) is the prob-
ability to migrate from the other region,  i; to destination region i; f it (wA; wB)P it
is the unconditional income density for region  i; and dividing by Pit+1 conditions for
living in region i after migration.
4.2.2 The e¤ect of income shocks on the income distribution
Besides migration, also shocks to income change the distribution of income pairs, Ft:
These shocks can be purely idiosyncratic or may e¤ect all individuals in the economy.
For a single agent, we can decompose the total shock it to her potential income in region
i (see equation 5) into an aggregate component it and an individual-specic component
!it :
it = it + !it; i = A;B:
The aggregate shock it for region i hits all agents equally and changes their potential
income for region i: Note that this shock does not depend on the actual region the agent
is living in. For example, a positive shock At > 0 increases the potential income in
region A for agents that are currently living in this region as well as for agents that are
currently living in region B: They realize this potential income by deciding to actually
live in region A: The correlation   between A and B measures the importance of the
economy-wide business cycles relative to the size of region-specic aggregate uctuations.
However, aggregate shocks are typically only a minor source of income variation
for an agent. Agents di¤er in various personal characteristics that result in di¤erent
income proles over time. Individuals di¤er in their skills and while the demand may
grow for the skill of one person, demand may deteriorate for another persons skills.
This heterogeneity is captured by the idiosyncratic shocks (!At; !Bt) : If !At is positive,
income prospects of the individual agent increase in region A: The correlation  ! between
!A and !B reects economy-wide demand shifts for a persons individual skills.
Since we assume aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to be independent, the variance
of the total shock to income, it; is the sum of the variances of idiosyncratic and aggregate
shocks: 2 = 
2
! + 
2
.
Persistency in incomes is captured by the autoregressive parameter  in equation (5) :
We abstain from the inclusion of permanently xed individual di¤erences (xed e¤ects)
primarily because this makes the model numerically much more tractable.7
7 If we were to include xed e¤ects that reect di¤erent types of agents, the model had to be solved
for each di¤erent type of agent just as it is now solved for the single type of agent.
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Idiosyncratic shocks, aggregate shocks, and the persistency of the income process
determine the transition of the distribution of income incentives after migration to the
distribution of migration incentives before migration in the next period: The income
distribution at the beginning of period t+1, Ft+1; results from adding idiosyncratic and
aggregate shocks to the distribution of income after migration in period t, F^t; of which
f^it (wA; wB) is the conditional density, see (12). When a household has income wit+1 in
period t+1, this can result from any possible combination of wit and it+1 = it+1+!it+1
for which
wit+1 = i (1  ) + wit + it+1 + !it+1 (13)
holds. Solving this equation for wit we obtain
wi (wit+1; it+1; !it+1) := wit =
wit+1   (it+1 + !it+1)

  i
(1  )

: (14)
This wi (wit+1; it+1; !it+1) is the time-t potential income in region i that is consistent
with a future potential income of wit+1 and realizations of shocks it+1 + !it+1 at the
beginning of period t + 1: Now suppose that both kinds of shocks,  and !; have been
realized. Then, wA;B is a one-to-one mapping of future income (wAt+1; wBt+1) to current
income (wAt; wBt) :
The conditional density of observing the future income pair (wAt+1; wBt+1) can thus
be obtained from a retrospective. The income pair (wA; w

B) of past incomes corresponds
uniquely to a future income pair (wAt+1; wBt+1) : Consequently, we can express the
density of the income distribution at time t + 1 using the income distribution after
migration F^t; and its conditional density f^it: The density of the income distribution
Ft+1 conditional on the region and the vector of shocks is given by
fit+1 (wA; wBjAt+1; Bt+1; !At+1; !Bt+1)
= f^it (w

A (wA; At+1; !At+1) ; w

B (wB; Bt+1; !Bt+1)) : (15)
Weighting this density with the density of the idiosyncratic shocks h (!At+1; !Bt+1)
yields the density of observing the future income pair (wA; w

B) together with the idio-
syncratic shock (!At+1; !Bt+1) :
f^it (w

A (wA; At+1; !At+1) ; w

B (wB; Bt+1; !Bt+1))  h (!At+1; !Bt+1) :
Integrating over all possible idiosyncratic shocks (!At+1; !Bt+1) gives the density
fit+1 of the income distribution before migration in period t+1 for a certain combination
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of aggregate shocks (At+1; Bt+1):
fit+1 (wA; wBjAt+1; Bt+1) =Z
f^it (w

A (wA; At+1; !A) ; w

B (wB; Bt+1; !B))  h (!A; !B) d!Ad!B: (16)
For given aggregate shocks, this new distribution determines migration from region i to
region  i according to equation (10) for time t+ 1:
The evolution of income distributions can thus be summarized as follows. Between
two consecutive periods, the conditional distribution of potential incomes rst evolves
as a result of migration decisions, moving the density from fit to f^it: Thereafter, the
distribution is again altered by aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to income, moving
the density from f^it to fit+1: The latter density now determines migration decisions in
time t+1; starting the cycle over again. In other words, migration incentives are not only
a result of past income shocks, but also a result of past migration decisions. Keeping
track of the distributional dynamics of migration incentives is at the heart of our model.
This is the di¤erence to most other empirical models of migration.
5 Simulation analysis
5.1 Numerical aspects
The rst step in solving the model numerically is to obtain a solution to (6) : We do so
by value-function iteration.8 For this value-function iteration, we rst approximate the
bivariate process of potential incomes for an individual agent in regions A and B 
wAt
wBt
!
= wt =  (1  ) + wt 1 + t (17)
by a Markov chain.9 Because wA and wB are correlated through the correlation structure
in ; it is easier to work with the orthogonal components
 
w+A ; w
+
B

of (wA; wB) in the
value function iteration.
We evaluate the value function on an equi-spaced grid for the orthogonal compo-
nents with a width of 4+A;B around their means, where +A;B denote the long-run
standard deviations of the orthogonal components. The grid is chosen to capture al-
8See for example Adda and Cooper (2003) for an overview of dynamic programming techniques.
9To save on notation we drop the regional index of a variable pair like (wAt; wBt) and just denote the
pair by wt:
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most all movements of the income distribution F later on.10 Given this grid, we can use
Tauchens (1986) algorithm to obtain the transition probabilities for the Markov-chain
approximation of the income process in (17) :
We apply a multigrid algorithm (see Chow and Tsitsiklis, 1991) to speed up the
calculation of the value function. This algorithm works iteratively. It rst solves the
dynamic programming problem for a coarse grid and then doubles the number of grid-
points in each iteration until the grid is ne enough. In between iterations the solution
for the coarser grid is used to generate the initial guess for the value-function iteration of
the new grid. The initial grid has 161632 points (income A  income B  migration
costs) and the nal grid has 128128 points for income and 256 points for migration
costs.11
The solution of (6) yields the optimal migration policy and thus the microeconomic
migration hazard rates i: With these hazard rates, we can obtain a series of aggregate
migration rates for a simulated economy as described in detail in Section 4.2 for any
realization of aggregate shocks (t)t=1:::T and an initial distribution F0:
This means that we need an initial distribution of income F0 to solve the sequen-
tial problem. Following Caballero and Engels (1999) suggestion, we use the ergodic
distribution of income F that would be obtained in the absence of aggregate income
shocks. This distribution is calculated by assuming that idiosyncratic shocks ! have the
full variance of : In the appendix, we show that the sequence of income distributions
converges to a unique ergodic distribution F in the absence of aggregate shocks. This
ergodic distribution F is a natural starting guess for F0 as Caballero and Engel (1999)
argue.
To simulate a series of migration rates which correspond to the aggregate migration
hazards
 
A;B

t=1:::T
; we draw a series of aggregate shocks (to the orthogonal basis) 
+A; 
+
B

t=1:::T
from a normal distribution with variance  

+A;B
2
;  2 [0; 1] : The
10The choice of 4+A;B is motivated as follows. We later assume in the simulations that about 99%
of the income shocks is due to the idiosyncratic component. Therefore, we can expect 99.9% of the
mass of the income distribution to fall within 3:29  p0:99+A;B = 3:27+A;B around the mean of the
distribution for any given year. Additionally, the mean income for each year moves within the band
3:29  p0:01+A;B = 0:33+A;B in again 99.9% of all years. Since the sum of both is 3:6+A;B ; a grid
variation of 4+A;B should not truncate the income distribution.
11To obtain the grid for migration costs, we rst discretize the [0;1] interval into an equi-spaced grid.
Then, we choose the grid points for the migration costs as the values of the inverse of the cumulative
distribution function of the costs evaluated at the equi-spaced grid. This yields a cost grid whose grid
points are equally likely to realize. By contrast to the income distribution, using such an "equally-likely
grid" is possible for the cost distribution, because the cost distribution is strictly stationary. Unlike the
income distribution, it does not move due to aggregate shocks. See Adda and Cooper (2003) or Tauchen
(1986) for the analog case of a stationary Markov chain with normal innovations.
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weight  measures the relative importance of aggregate shocks, relative to idiosyncratic
shocks, i.e. 2! = (1  )2 and 2 = 2 : Correspondingly, the orthogonal components
of the idiosyncratic shocks have variance (1  ) 

+A;B
2
.
5.2 Parameter choices
A number of parameters has to be determined to actually simulate our model numerically.
Our parameter of most interest is migration costs. Our baseline specication of the
model used for the simulations assumes migration costs to be Gamma-distributed, i.e.
the cumulative distribution function of migration costs is
G (c) =
1
ab  (b)
Z c
0
xb 1 exp
 x
a

dx: (18)
This distribution function has two parameters, a and b; which determine the mean ab and
the coe¢ cient of variation b 
1
2 : Although the mean cost is ab; one should note that the
average cost paid by a migrant can be smaller as she can wait and search for low migration
costs. In our simulations, we try three parameter combinations (a; b) to see their inuence
on the dynamics of interregional migration. We try one parameter constellation with
high, one with medium, and one with almost zero migration costs. We x the coe¢ cient
of variation to 1 and choose mean costs to be US$ 180,000, US$ 45,000, and US$ 1,
respectively. This allows us to assess the sensitivity of aggregate migration with respect
to moving costs. In particular, we are interested to see whether the high migration-cost
estimates reported in the literature are compatible with aggregate migration data in the
light of our model.
As an alternative to this baseline specication of stochastic, Gamma-distributed
migration costs, we also simulate the model with deterministic and constant costs of
migration. This alternative specication implies that migration hazards i (wA; wB) are
either zero or one, now. Moreover, there is no longer an option value of searching for low
migration costs that delays the migration decision in this simplied model. The only
option value that the migrant takes into account is the value to wait for good income
opportunities. When we estimate the model later on, we restrict our attention to this
specication with deterministic costs, because in the more complex specication with
stochastic migration costs, the two cost parameters a and b are only weakly identied
separately.
The second important set of parameters describes the process for income and the
income shocks : We need to specify the autocorrelation parameter  and the mean 
of the income process as well as its covariance structure. The covariance structure is
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composed of the total variance of income shocks 2 , the correlation of income shocks
between regions,   (aggregate) and  ! (idiosyncratic), and the fraction  of the income
shock that is due to aggregate factors, i.e. the correlation across individual agents.
We take the parameters for the income process mainly from the recent paper of
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaronx (2004). They estimate the dynamics of idiosyncratic
labor market risk for the US based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Thus the
paper conveys information on both income variances and autocorrelation of log household
income. Besides, the paper reports a mean household income of about US$ 45,000. To
approximately match this gure, we choose the mean of the log income to be  = 10:5:12
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaronx (2004) nd an annual autocorrelation of incomes of
roughly 0.95 and a standard deviation of idiosyncratic income shocks ranging from 0.09
to 0.14 for business cycle expansions and from 0.16 to 0.25 for business cycle contractions
(see Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaronx 2004, Table 2). They report a frequency weighted
average of 0.17 for those standard deviations in their preferred specication (Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaronx, 2004, pp. 711). Since we do not model di¤erent variances of
idiosyncratic shocks to income along the business cycle, we use their preferred average
value of 0.17 for the simulations.13
Combining both elements, the autocorrelation and the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks to income, we calculate the long-run variance of income to be 
2
!
1 2 = 0:30:
This number refers to persistent elements of income, which should be relevant to migra-
tion decisions. Of course, the uctuation of income that is observed in real data does
not only reect these persistent shocks. Indeed, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaronx (2004)
nd that transitory shocks to income add another variance term in the order of 0.065 to
this long-run variance. This means that transitory shocks are responsible for about 18%
of the total uctuations of income. However, we expect these transitory shocks to be of
minor relevance to migration choices, simply because they arrive at a too high frequency.
Technically, we assume that the transitory shocks realize after migration decisions are
taken and for this reason, we do not include any transitory components of income in the
microeconomic model.
At the macroeconomic level, however, the inclusion of a transitory shock to income
is of importance for two reasons if the model shall be compared to real-world data with
respect to the correlation of incomes and migration rates.
12A log-normally distributed variable has mean exp

+ 
2
2

where  and 2 are the mean and
variance of the logs.
13Other studies on the evolution of individual income report similar values, see the discussion in
Storesletten et al. (2004).
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Firstly, there will be some income uctuations at the macro level that are transitory
in a similar fashion as they exist at the micro level. This will inuence the correlation
of incomes and migration right away.
Secondly, and maybe more importantly, we have to take into account the fact that
income measures migration incentives perfectly in our model while it obviously does not
do so in the real world. For example, uctuations in regional price levels, changes in the
supply of public goods, or the fact that the empirical income concept is itself noisy, all
together, weaken the relationship of income and migration at the aggregate level. This
means that the model will produce unrealistically large correlations of income di¤eren-
tials and migration rates at the macroeconomic level if these aspects of measurement are
ignored.
Both aspects, transitory income uctuations and measurement problems, can be ad-
dressed by augmenting the model by a transitory error term of income.14 For this reason,
we introduce a such a term in the form of a pseudo normally distributed transitory shock
to aggregate incomes. This transitory income component ' has no inuence on the dis-
tribution of migration rates but only on the correlation of migration rates and incomes.
We use the numbers reported by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaronx (2004) for idiosyn-
cratic shocks as an orientation. These numbers lead us to assume that the aggregate
transitory shock ' has 18% of the long-run variance of the permanent aggregate income
component, i.e. 2' =
0:182
1 2 . This number seems to be a lower bound, however, because
measurement errors should be an additional component of the transitory shock. For this
reason, we estimate the magnitude of the transitory shock along with migration costs in
the actual estimation of our model.
In order to describe the income process completely, two elements of the variance-
covariance structure still have to be specied. We need to determine the magnitude of
permanent aggregate uctuations and the correlation of income shocks across regions.
Unfortunately, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaronx (2004) do not report numbers on ag-
gregate income risk, so that we take this data from a di¤erent source. We estimate the
variance of aggregate shocks to income from income per capita data for US states for the
years 1969 - 2004 as reported in the REIS database of the BEA. This data is deated
using the US-wide consumer price index. Moreover, we remove xed e¤ects and a linear
time trend from the income data. The residual variance of log income for US states over
time is roughly 0:002.15
14This strategy picks up the idea of Erickson and Whited (2000) to rationalize empirically observed
low investment-q sensitivities.
15Note that for the comparison of our model with real-world data we use a shorter time horizon to
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To calculate the fraction, ; of income risk due to aggregate uctuations, we compare
this estimated long-run aggregate variance with the long-run idiosyncratic variance of
income that is implied by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaronxs (2004) estimate of 
2
!
1 2 =
0:30. This number and and aggregate uctuations of variance 
2

1 2 = 0:002 implies an
overall long-run variance of income of 0.302. In turn, aggregate income risk accounts
only for a fraction of approximately 0:0020:3+0:002
= 0:006 of total income risk. For the
simulations, we use this number to specify : However, our rough calculation of the
fraction of aggregate shocks can only be an approximation. Therefore, we actually
estimate this fraction later on.
Finally, we need to specify the correlations of shocks to income across regions,  !
and  . These correlations refer to potential incomes and are therefore inherently unob-
servable. We assume that transitory, aggregate, and individual correlation coe¢ cients
are equal, i.e.  ! =   =  '; so that we only need to specify one common parameter.
In our simulation exercise, we measure  as the correlation coe¢ cient of state-average
income per capita and the US-average per capita income (both in logs, CPI deated
and taking xed e¤ects and a linear time trend into account). From the REIS database,
we infer a partial correlation coe¢ cient of  ^ = 0:578. Again, this number can only be
a rst approximation. For the estimation, we abstain from xing the parameter  but
estimate it along with migration costs.
As we work with annual data, we choose the discount factor  = 0:95: Table 1
summarizes our parameter choices for the three specications that we simulate.
5.3 Simulation results
We simulate our model for 51 pairs of regions and 26 years, but we drop the rst 10
years for each region to minimize the inuence of our initial choice of F0: This generates
a simulated dataset for migration that has the same size as the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) area-to-area migration ow dataset, which is our empirical benchmark. This data
base contains area-to-area migration ow data for US states for the years 1989-2004.
Income data is taken from the REIS database, CPI deated, and in logs. A detailed
data description for both IRS and REIS data can found in the data appendix. In order
to minimize simulation uncertainty, we replicate each simulation 10 times and report the
averages over the simulations.
Of course the actual migrant faces a more complex decision problem than the one
calculate summary statistics. This is done to match the length of the IRS data. This implies that the
within sample variance of aggregate income presented in these summary statistics is smaller than the
estimate of the long-run variance presented here.
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Table 1: Parameter choices for the simulation analysis
Storesletten REIS Simulation
et al. (2004) data
Fraction of aggregate shocks   0.006 0.006
Correlation of shocks across regions   0.578 0.578
Long-run variance of incomes 
2
!+
2

1 2 0.30 0.002 0.302
Variance of transitory aggregate income shock   3.6110 4
Autocorrelation of income  0.95  0.95
Discount factor    0.95
simulated in our model of two regions. Including D.C. as a destination region, an agent
has to decide between 50 possible alternatives states where she can move to. To make
this comparable to our model, the 50 alternatives in the data have to be aggregated
to a single complementary region.16 The population-weighted average income over all
alternative 50 states is used as the average income of the alternative region.
In order to characterize the results of the simulation exercise, we have to calculate
a number of moments from the simulated dataset and compare these moments to the
moments that we observe in the actual IRS and REIS data. This comparison tells us how
well our model is capable of replicating characteristic features of the actual migration
and income data at an aggregate level. In particular, the comparison tells us which of
the three considered levels of migration costs is best compatible with the observed data.
Such way of inference is frequently applied in the literature on real business cycles, see
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) or Baxter and Crucini (1993) and many others.
The lines along which this literature has typically described aggregate uctuations
guide our choice of characterizing moments: variances, covariances, autocorrelations, and
16Generating articial bi-regional data means that we assume technically that the best income oppor-
tunity over all alternative regions follows the log-normal distribution assumed in our model.
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means. We compare average migration rates, the standard deviation of migration rates,
their autocorrelation, and the cross-correlation of migration rates. Besides, we look at
the implications of the di¤erent migration cost regimes on the level and uctuations
of average incomes. To measure the cyclical behavior of migration, we calculate the
mean of in- and outmigration rates and correlate this with the average income in both
regions. In the simulated data, the average income in region i is calculated wit :=
ln
R
expwif^it (wi; w i) dwidw i

; i.e. the income obtained after migration decisions
have been taken. Additionally, we run a typical reduced form migration regression that
relates migration rates to the average incomes in source and destination region.
We run two sets of simulation exercises. One set features stochastic migration costs
that are Gamma-distributed. The other set of simulation exercises assumes migration
costs to be deterministic and constant over time. While the rst formulation may be
regarded as being more realistic, since migration costs are modelled more exible at
the household level, the corresponding simulation results are harder to interpret at the
same time. Stochastic migration costs and the households option to search for low
costs of migration drive a wedge between the expected level of migration costs and the
costs that are actually incurred by the migrating households. In other words, the rst
set of simulations involves two di¤erent measures of migration costs. This makes our
analysis somewhat di¢ cult to relate to ndings of previous studies, which work with a
deterministic formulation of migration costs. This is the reason why we also report a set
of simulation exercises in which migration costs are xed to a deterministic value.
Table 2 reports the results of our rst set of simulation exercises, in which migration
costs are stochastic and follow a Gamma-distribution. The rst experiment uses cost
parameters close to what has been reported in the literature. We x the coe¢ cient of
variation in all three experiments to one. To match an average migration cost of US$
180,000 as reported in Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001), we set a = 180; 000. The
results of this experiment are displayed in column (1) of Table 2.
Compared to the actual data, the annual migration rates are too low. While we
observe an annual average migration rate of 3.9%, the model predicts a migration rate
of only 2.9%. With US$ 180,000, expected migration costs are too high. Also migration
rates uctuate less in the simulated data than in the actual data. Simulated migration
rates are too much procyclical and the cross-correlation of incomes is 0.611, while the
correlation of income shocks  was set to be 0.578. With migration costs being stochas-
tic, the actually incurred migration costs are with about US$ 23,000 much lower than
the expected migration costs. This di¤erence stems from the substantial variation of
migration costs which was imposed by our ad hoc choice of b = 1. In turn, potential
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Table 2: Simulation results: stochastic, Gamma-distributed migration costs
Data high medium zero
costs (1) costs (2) costs (3)
Average annual migration rate 0.039 0.029 0.041 0.102
Standard deviation of annual migration rates 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.009
Autocorrelation of migration rates1 0.807 0.839 0.739 0.279
Cross correlation of migration rates1 0.047 -0.972 -0.979 -0.991
Mean of log average income 10.710 10.825 10.836 10.833
Standard deviation of log average income 0.030 0.027 0.026 0.025
Cross-correlation of log average income 1 0.578 0.611 0.652 0.737
Variance of household income 0.299 0.295 0.287 0.261
Correlation of
 
i +  i

and ( wi + w i)
(procyclicality)1 0.215 0.540 0.467 0.016
Sensitivity of immigration into region i 2
w.r.t. average income in region i 0.061 0.068 0.103 0.111
w.r.t. average income in region  i -0.063 -0.063 -0.097 -0.110
Average incurred migration costs 23,043 10,675 0.99
1 Partial correlation controlling for a linear time trend and xed e¤ects.
2 Coe¢ cients of a reduced form regression of migration rates on incomes in both
regions.
All three specications assume a coe¢ cent of variation of 1 for migration costs, i.e.
b = 1. The high cost specication assumes expected migration costs to be US$ 180,000,
i.e. a = 180; 000: The medium cost specication assumes a = 45; 000 and the zero cost
specication sets a = 1 for numerical feasiblity. We simulate data on 51 region-pairs
and a 26 year history of migration and income data. The rst 10 years of simulated
data are dropped in order to minimize the inuence of initial values. Each simulation is
repeated 10 times. 24
migrants wait for low realizations of migration costs which are drawn every period anew.
In summary, the high cost specication implies too little migration and too little
uctuation of the migration rates, while income uctuation is realistic. Therefore, we
try a specication with lower migration costs. We set a = 45; 000; so that expected
migration costs are divided by four and now equal an average annual income of US$
45,000. With these lower migration costs, migration rates increase substantially and are
with 4.1% very close to the observed average migration rate. Also the standard deviation
of migration rates is very close to the one we observe in the data. Migration also becomes
less procyclical, but aggregate migration responds overly strong to aggregate income. A
further result of lower migration costs is an increase in average income by 1.1% compared
to the high cost specication. With lower migration costs, the agents are more often
in the region where their income is larger. However, households are in their preferred
region most of the time already in the high cost specication, so that potential benets
of further migration are small. This reects that the actually incurred migration costs
are relatively small already in the specication with high costs. In the specication with
medium expected migration costs, the incurred costs are even smaller and only amount
to US$ 10,675.
While the rst scenario displayed an extreme bound of high migration costs, the
third scenario of almost no migration costs provides a lower bound. It clearly shows
how inuential it is to keep track of the evolution of migration incentives. In a model
in which migration incentives are drawn randomly, we should observe migration rates of
50% in the absence of migration costs. By contrast, our model predicts a substantially
lower migration rate of 10.2% when migration costs are absent. This di¤erence stems
from the fact that in our model migration incentives are not drawn purely randomly.
Instead, they depend on previous migration decisions and income shocks.
The di¤erences between the three cost specications become even more pronounced
when we assume migration costs to be deterministic, see Table 3. Qualitatively the
results do not change when apply this simplication. Quantitatively, the di¤erences
between the three specications become more pronounced though. Migration rates are
far too low in the high cost specication and they uctuate way too little. The e¢ ciency
gain due to better allocation of households to regions measured by the average income is
substantially larger when migration costs are reduced from US$ 180,000 to US$ 45,000.
Here, the average income increases by 3.7%.
Overall, our various simulation exercises do not yet allow a decisive assessment of
which level of migration costs ts the data best. The average migration rates and their
uctuations are best captured by the medium cost formulation. However, the overall
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Table 3: Simulation results: deterministic migration costs
Data high medium zero
costs (1) costs (2) costs (3)
Average annual migration rate 0.039 0.010 0.024 0.102
Standard deviation of annual migration rates 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.009
Autocorrelation of migration rates1 0.807 0.687 0.633 0.279
Cross correlation of migration rates1 0.047 -0.785 -0.941 -0.991
Mean of log average income 10.710 10.784 10.821 10.833
Standard deviation of log average income 0.030 0.027 0.026 0.025
Cross-correlation of log average income 1 0.578 0.560 0.616 0.737
Variance of household income 0.299 0.310 0.277 0.261
Correlation of
 
i +  i

and ( wi + w i)
(procyclicality)1 0.215 0.550 0.457 0.016
Sensitivity of immigration into region i 2
w.r.t. average income in region i 0.061 0.033 0.078 0.111
w.r.t. average income in region  i -0.063 -0.024 -0.068 -0.110
Average incurred migration costs 180,000 45,000 1
1 Partial correlation controlling for a linear time trend and xed e¤ects.
2 Coe¢ cients of a reduced form regression of migration rates on incomes in both
regions.
All three specications assume deterministic migration costs. The high cost
specication assumes migration costs to be US$ 180,000: The medium cost
specication assumes migration costs of US$ 45; 000 and the zero cost specication
assumes one US$ of migration costs for numerical feasiblity. We simulate data on 51
region-pairs and a 26 year history of migration and income data. The rst 10 years of
simulated data are dropped in order to minimize the inuence of initial values. Each
simulation is repeated 10 times. 26
match of the simulated data with the observed data is not perfect.
6 Estimation
We rely on an indirect inference procedure in order to nd the parameters of our model
that allow us to match closest the observed patterns of migration that are in the data.
In particular, we apply a method of simulated moments (MSM) as has been proposed by
Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993) to obtain estimates of structural parameters
when the likelihood function of the structural model becomes intractable, as in our
setting.
6.1 Methodology
Indirect inference is the natural extension of the simulation exercise presented in the
previous section. The idea behind this methodology is to choose a set of moments that
captures the characteristics of the data, and then to calibrate and simulate the structural
economic model such that the moments are best replicated by the simulation.
Accordingly, we rst decide on an informative set of moments %: We select the stan-
dard deviation of migration rates, the standard deviation of average incomes, and the
correlation of average incomes across regions as the rst three moments to be matched.
To this set of moments we add the estimated parameters from a reduced form regression
of migration rates on the incomes of the destination and the source region. To make the
regression scale invariant with respect to incomes, we use log-deviations from average
incomes as the income variables, i.e. we estimate
mit = 0 + 1 (wit   wi) + 2 (w it   w i) + uit: (19)
The parameters 1 and 2 reect income sensitivities of migration. For the simulated
data, these sensitivies were reported lower parts of Tables 2 and 3. The intercept 0
captures the average of migration rates.
We simulate our model for a given vector of model parameters  and calculate the
distance between the moments obtained from this simulation %^ () and the sample mo-
ments %S . We use the covariance matrix of %S obtained by 10000 bootstrap replications
as a weigthing matrix so that our distance and goodness-of-t measure is
L = (%S   %^ ())0 cov (%S) 1 (%S   %^ ()) : (20)
Naturally, we cannot estimate all parameters of the model, since this would be nu-
merically infeasible. We restrict ourselves to the estimation of migration costs and the
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correlation of shocks to potential incomes both across individuals () and across regions
( ). We opt for the estimation of  and  , because these parameters cannot be inferred
from realized income data alone as we argued previously. Since migration smoothes
income, the counterparts to  and  in terms of a covariance structure in realized in-
comes are substantially inuenced by the size of migration costs. At the same time, we
expect  and  to have a signicant inuence on the behavior of aggregate migration
itself. However, this argument does not hold true for the correlation of the transitory
aggregate income shock ': This transitory shock is irrelevant to the migration decision
itself, and hence its e¤ect cannot be smoothed by migration. For this reason, we x
the correlation of the transitory aggregate income shock  ' at the value of the observed
correlation of incomes in the REIS data.
While we have tried both a stochastic as well as a deterministic specication of
migration costs in the simulations, we restrict ourselves to the estimation of a specica-
tion with deterministic costs for two reasons. First, the formulation with deterministic
cost is much easier to interpret and to compare to other studies, as migration costs
are captured by a single number to be estimated. Second, the two parameters of the
Gamma-distribution in a formulation with stochastic costs are only weakly identied
separately. Indeed, we nd that the formulation with stochastic costs increases the risk
of running into local minima of the distance measure L:
We estimate 2' along with the other model parameters, so that our set of estimated
parameters nally is  =
 
migration costs;  ; ; 2'

:17
6.2 Estimation results
Table 4 displays the point estimates of the matched moments calculated from the IRS and
REIS data and the corresponding moments obtained from the simulation of our model
with the estimated parameters. Overall our model is able to replicate the observed
moments closely. In fact, the overidentication test reported at the bottom of Table 5
does not reject our model.
Table 5 presents the estimates of the model parameters and the 2 (2)-distributed
overdentication test. The estimated migration costs are US$ 19,707. This number lies
below the costs considered in the previous section for the medium specication with
deterministic costs. It falls between the average incurred costs of the medium and the
high cost-specication with stochastic costs. In any case, it is a smaller number than
the estimates reported in other contributions such as Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001)
17To save on computation time, we use a smaller grid than in the simulation exercises. We choose a
grid of 6464 128 points to approximate the state space.
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Table 4: Simulated moments estimation: moments estimates
Moment Actual Moments Simulated Moments
Migration rates
standard deviation 0.0036 0.0036
Income
standard deviation 0.0299 0.0297
correlation across regions 0.5776 0.5646
Reduced form regression
intercept (average migration rate) 0.0393 0.0392
sensitivity to destination income 0.0609 0.0617
sensitivity to source region income -0.0627 -0.0604
The column Actual Momentsrefers to the moments estimated from the combined
REIS/IRS data set, with data on 50 US states and D.C. over the period 1989-2004.
The column Simulated Momentsrefers to the moments estimated from the simulation
of the model using the parameters given in Table 5. Both actual and simulated data
are within-transformed and linearly de-trended. The simulations generate a panel of 51
region-pairs and a 26-year history of migration and income data. The rst 10 years of
simulated data are dropped in order to minimize the inuence of initial values. Each
simulation is repeated 5 times and data moments are compared to the average over the
5 replications of the simulation.
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or Kennan and Walker (2006).
The estimated value of the correlation of income shocks across regions is 0.2507. This
is substantially smaller than we specied for the simulations, having set the correlation
of shocks equal to the observed correlation of realized incomes (0.5776, see Table 1).
Migration ties together more closely the average incomes of both regions than they were
tied together without migration. The realized incomes co-move more strongly than the
shocks to the income process. This drives a wedge between the correlation of income
shocks and the correlation of average realized incomes, the latter being always larger
than the former.
The estimated fraction of income shocks that is aggregate amounts to 0.0043. This
size of the aggregate shock corresponds closely to the value we previously assumed.
There is a signicant transitory income component in the aggregate income uctua-
tions, which has an estimated standard deviation of 0.0265. This means that transitory
uctuations in aggregate income add a variance term that has about 54% of the long-
run variance of potential incomes

0:02652
0:00430:302 = 0:5408

. However, migration smoothes
realized income, so that transitory shocks make up 78% of the aggregate variance in
realized income.
As outlined before, the transitory income component of our model relates to two
sources: to truely transitory uctuations in incomes and to the fact that migration
is not perfectly driven by income incentives alone. The latter aspect refers to other
aggregate factors that are important to migration ows and were subsumed as income
in our model.
6.3 Comparison of cost estimates
To provide further evidence on the inuence of the dynamics of the incentive distribution
on the estimation of migration costs, we apply a static random utility model to data
generated from a simulation of our dynamic model. The generated data set comprises
51 pairs of regions and 16 years of data. The parameters of the model are xed to the
values as estimated in the previous section.
The aim of this exercise is to facilitate a direct comparison of static and dynamic
approaches to the estimation of migration costs. In particular, we apply a conditional-
logit approach similar to Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001) to describe the migration
decision. Simplifying Davies, Greenwood, and Lis model and adapting it to our bi-
regional framework, the likelihood of the conditional logit model becomes
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Table 5: Simulated moments estimation: structural parameter estimates
Parameter Estimated value
Migration costs 19707
(655:49)
Correlation of income shocks across regions 	 0.2507
(0:0103)
Fraction of income shock due to aggregate uctuations  0.0043
(0:0004)
Standard deviation of transitory income shock  ' 0.0265
(0:0010)
2(2) 0.9593
p-value 0.619
Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimation is carried out using the simulated moments
estimator in Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993), which chooses structural model
parameters by matching the moments from a simulated panel of regions matching the
moments as displayed in Table 4. The simulations generate a panel of 51 region-pairs
and a 26-year history of migration and income data. The rst 10 years of simulated
data are dropped in order to minimize the inuence of initial values. Each simulation is
repeated 5 times and data moments are compared to the average over the 5
replications of the simulation.
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Table 6: Simulation results: comparison to cost estimate based on a static random utility
model
Migration cost (from estimation) 19,707
Average annual income 53,906
Migration cost estimate
based on a static random utility model 102,930
lnL =
X
t
X
i=1;2
24 itPit ln 11+expfc+( wit  w it)g
+
 
1  it

Pit ln

1
1+expf c ( wit  w it)g
35 : (21)
While Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001) include a set of other variables to describe the
utility gained from location choice, our simulated model just allows for log income as
an explanatory variable. This means that the form of the likelihood function in (21)
assumes that utility is composed of an income component (with sensitivity  > 0) and
a disutility from migration c < 0. The estimated money measure of this disutility is
exp

w   c^^

, see Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001). Since our model is composed of
two regions only, we cannot estimate  and c from a cross-section as Davies, Greenwood,
and Li (2001) do, but have to pool the simulated data instead.
We want to abstract from the additional problem that income data measures migra-
tion incentives imperfectly. Otherwise, this would drive up estimated migration costs
and bias the comparison against the static approach. For this reason, we simulate the dy-
namic model having set all parameters to their estimated values except for the variance
of the measurement error, which is set to zero instead.
The imputed migration costs taken from our estimation are US$ 19,707. By con-
trast, the conditional logit estimation suggests a cost of US$ 102,930, a number that is
substantially higher (see Table 6). In terms of annual incomes this corresponds to 0.4
and 2 average annual incomes, respectively. This comparative exercise shows that the
estimation of the structural parameters is likely to be subject to a bias if the unobserved
dynamics of the distribution of incentives is not taken into account.
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7 Conclusion
We have provided a tractable model of aggregate migration with a sound microeconomic
foundation. The paper is a contribution to the recently evolving literature on structural
models of migration. We explicitly deal with the problem of the unobservability of
potential gains from migration and their dynamic character. The dynamic character of
migration incentives has two aspects. First, the individual gains from migration evolve
stochastically over time, but will typically display a high degree of persistency. Second,
at an aggregate level, the distribution of migration incentives is a result of past migration
decisions themselves.
Starting o¤ from the microeconomic decision problem allows us to keep track of the
dynamics of the incentive distribution. This distributional dynamics may be refered to
as a dynamic self-selection problem. Neglecting this self-selection problem may result in
biased estimates of structural parameters, such as migration costs. In our application to
US interstate migration, we nd the estimated migration costs to be substantially lower
than those reported in previous studies. The estimated migration costs amount to about
US$ 20,000, which corresponds to less than one-half of an average annual income.
Our analysis calls once more for a careful treatment of the self-selection problem
when economic incentives are not fully observable. What makes this issue particularly
relevant for the analysis of migration is that the unobservable incentives are highly
autocorrelated though not perfectly persistent. Rather than being drawn every period
anew, migration incentives have a long memory. One example of this long memory of
migration incentives is the persistency that income displays.
This may be of importance not only to macro-studies of migration. Also at a micro
level, income potentials are typically unobservable and have to be proxied. But such
approximation regularly neglects self-selection. If households live in their prefered place
of residence as a result of their location choice, and if all observable things are equal,
then it must be the unobserved component of their preferences that is in favor of the
place where they actually are. Besides unobservable parts of income, this unobservable
component of preferences can also comprise di¤erent valuations of di¤erent amenities
and social networks. Also these factors can be expected to exhibit persistency.
We integrated the persistency of unobserved migration incentives in a structural
dynamic microeconomic model of the migration decision. This consequently allowed
us to simulate the joint behavior of the observed migration rates, of the unobserved
migration incentives, and of their observable proxy, incomes.
Future research calls for a more complex microeconomic model that integrates more
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information into the macroeconomic analysis, for example labor market conditions and
amenities. Additionally, it would be desirable to extend our bi-regional approach to
the case of multiple regions, as in Davies, Greenwood and Li (2001), and Kennan and
Walker (2006). Ultimately, migration should be analyzed in a more complex general
equilibrium framework. However, all this goes beyond what is currently numerically
feasible, in particular if the model is meant to be estimated.
Both our treatment of the self-selection problem and the inference of microeconomic
structural parameters from macroeconomic data is an attempt to overcome the di-
chotomy of macro and micro studies that has characterized the migration literature
(see Greenwood, 1997). Beyond the application to migration decisions, our treatment of
the dynamic self-selection problem may also be applicable to other important discrete
choices in an economy, for example labor-market participation.
8 Appendix
8.1 Existence and uniqueness of the value function
We begin with proving existence and uniqueness of the value function. Notation is as in
the main text throughout this appendix, unless stated otherwise.
To ease the exposition, we assume that the income process is only approximately
log-normal. In particular, we assume that income has a nite support.
Denition 1 Let W =

W;W

be the support of w.
Denition 2 Dene a mapping T according to the migration problem of a household,
that is
T (u) () = max
j=A;B

exp (wjt)  Ifi6=jgct + Etu (j; ct+1; wAt+1; wBt+1)
	
: (22)
The mapping T is dened on the set of all real-valued, bounded functions B that are
continuous with respect to wA;B and c and have domain D = fA;Bg  R+ W2:
Lemma 3 The mapping T preserves boundedness.
Proof. To show that T preserves boundedness one has to show that for any bounded
function u also Tu is bounded. Consider u to be bounded from above by u and bounded
from below by u: Then, Tu is bounded, because
Tu = max
j=A;B

exp (wjt)  Ifi6=jgct + Etu (j; ct+1; wAt+1; wBt+1)
	  exp   W + u <1;
(23)
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and
Tu= max
j=A;B

exp (wjt)  Ifi6=jgct + Etu (j; ct+1; wAt+1; wBt+1)
	
(24)
 max
j=A;B

exp (wjt)  Ifi6=jgct + u
	  exp (W ) + u >  1: (25)
Lemma 4 The mapping T preserves continuity.
Proof. Since Tu is the maximum of two continuous functions it is itself continuous.
Lemma 5 The mapping T satises Blackwells conditions.
Proof. First we need to show that for any u1 () < u2 () the mapping T preserves
the inequality. Since both the expectations operator and the max operator preserve the
inequality, also T does. Secondly, we need to show that T (u+ a)  Tu + a for any
constant a and some  < 1: Straightforward algebra shows that
T (u+ a) = Tu+ a: (26)
Since  < 1 by assumption, T satises Blackwells conditions.
Proposition 6 The mapping T has a unique xed point on B, and hence the Bellman-
equation has a unique solution.
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from the last three Lemmas.
8.2 Invariant distribution
We prove that migration and idiosyncratic shocks to income describe an ergodic Markov-
process if there are no aggregate shocks. Therefore, there is an invariant distribution
the sequence of income distributions converges to.
For simplicity, we present the proof for an arbitrary discrete approximation of the
model with a continuous state-space for income.
Lemma 7 Assume any (large and ne enough but otherwise arbitrary) discretization
of the state space with n points for the potential income in the regions, each. Then,
we can capture the transition from ft to ft+1; which are the unconditional densities
of the distribution of households over both regions and potential incomes, in a matrix
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B =
 
(I  DA) DB
DA (I  DB)
!
2 R2n22n2.18 In this matrix,  denotes the transition
matrix that approximates the AR(1)-process for income by a Markov-chain, see Adda
and Cooper (2003, pp. 56) for details. Matrix Di is the n2  n2 diagonal matrix with
the migration hazard rates for each of the n2 income pairs of the income grid.
Proof. First, we take a discrete state-space of n possible wages for each region, wA1:::wBn
and wB1:::wBn: Second, we denote the vector of probabilities that describes the distribu-
tion of potential incomes and household locations in the following form
f =

f (A;wA1; wB1) ::: f (A;wAn; wB1) ::: f (A;wAn; wBn) f (B;wA1; wB1) ::: f (B;wAn; wBn)
0
:
(27)
Analogously, we dene the distribution after migration but before idiosyncratic shocks,
f^ . Taking our law of motion from (16) ; we obtain as a discretized analog
ft+1 = (I2 
) f^t: (28)
Here 
 denotes the Kronecker product. Now, dene di as the fraction of households that
migrate and are in the i   th income and location triple given our vectorization of the
income grid. This means that di = j (wAk; wBl) ; i = 1:::2n2; where (j; wAk; wBl) being
the i-th element in the vectorized grid. Moreover, dene D = diag (d) as the diagonal
matrix with migration rates on the diagonal and DA and DB as the diagonal matrices
with only the rst n2 and the last n2 elements of d; respectively. Then, we can describe
the transition from ft to f^t by
f^t =
 
I  DA DB
DA I  DB
!
ft (29)
Combining the last two equations, we obtain
ft+1 =
 
(I  DA) DB
DA (I  DB)
!
ft: (30)
Lemma 8 For any distribution of idiosyncratic shocks with support equal to W2; matrix
 has only strictly positive entries.
18Since we work with a discretization, correctly speaking f is not the density, but the vactor of
probabities of drawing a location-income possibility vector from a given element of the grid.
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Proof. If the idiosyncratic shocks have support equal to W2; then every pair of potential
incomes can be reached from every other pair as a result of the shock, because we assume
the shocks to incoem being approximately log-normal. Thus, all entries of  are strictly
positive.
Lemma 9 For any distribution of costs with support equal to R+; the inequalities 0 
di < 1 hold for all diagonal elements di of D. If the grid is ne enough also di > 0 holds
at least for one i:
Proof. If there is no upper bound to migration costs, the migration probability is
strictly smaller than 1, since V is bounded. This means 0  di < 1: Let Cmax =
max(wA;wB)2W2 jc (wA; wB) j be the largest possible gain from migration. If the grid for
costs is ne enough, there will always be a grid-point of migration costs that is smaller
than this maximal gain Cmax: This is because migration costs can be arbitrarily close to
zero. Hence, there is some i such that di > 0 holds if the grid is ne enough.
Lemma 10 For any distribution of costs with support equal to R+, B2 has only positive
entries.
Proof. We obtain for B2
B2 = BB =
 
((I  DA))2 +DBDA (I  DA)DB+DB(I  DB)
(I  DB)DA+DA(I  DA) ((I  DB))2 +DADB
!
:
(31)
Each entry of this matrix is weakly positive, because (I  Di) ; Di; and  are positive.
Hence, we only need to argue that in each sum at least one part is always strictly positive.
For the elements on the diagonal, this follows directly from (I  Di) > 0: For the o¤-
diagonal elements, there may be some rows of zeros in Di: However, at least one row
of Di will be non-zero, because there is some non-zero di and (I  Di) > 0 because
of the Lemma above. Consequently, all elements of (I  Di)Dj are strictly positive.
Proposition 11 Under the assumptions of the above Lemmas, migration and idiosyn-
cratic shocks dene an ergodic process with stationary distribution F0 = limn!1Bnei:
Proof. The above Lemma directly implies the ergodicity of the Markov chain.
8.3 Data
Data on migration between US states are provided by the US Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). The IRS uses individual income tax returns to calculate internal migration ows
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between US states. In particular, the IRS compiles migration data by matching the
Social Security number of the primary taxpayer from one year to the next. The IRS
identies households with an address change since the previous year, and then totals
migration to and from each state in the US to every other state. Given these bilateral
migration data, we compute aggregate gross immigration for the 50 US states and the
District of Columbia as the sum of all immigrations from other US states to a particular
state. Migration rates are calculated by expressing gross immigration as proportions
of the number of non-migrants reported in the IRS dataset. The IRS state-to-state
migration-ow data is available for the years 1989-2004.
Income per capita data are taken from the Regional Economic Information System
(REIS) compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The REIS data is available online
at www.bea.gov/bea/regional/reis/. The income-per-capita gure for the alternative
region is computed as the population-weighted mean of all per-capita incomes outside a
specic state.
We remove a linear time trend from all data and express all variables as deviations
from their unit-specic means (rescaled by their overall mean), i.e. we apply a within-
transformation. Table 7 reports descriptive statistics for the original as well as for the
transformed data.
In order to examine the time-series properties of the data employed, we perform a
unit-root analysis for migration rates and income data. In a sample of this size (T =
16; N = 51) either a Breitung and Meyer (1994) or a Levin, Lin, and Chu (2003) unit-
root test are most appropriate. For the Breitung and Meyer (1994) test, we determined
the optimal augmentation lag length by sequential t testing. Taking into account three
augmentation lags and time-specic e¤ects we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root at the 5% level of signicance. Similarily, the Levin, Lin, and Chu (2003) test
rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root taking a linear time trend into account.
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